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"TRAFFIC BAN, A MEANS TO COMBAT SMOG?' 
In the summer and autumn of 1989, smog fonnation occured several times in 
the Netherlands, resulting in a discusBion concerning possihle 
controlling measures. üfith a view to temporary peduction of the air pollution 
agreements were made with the petrochemical and chemical industries 
regarding production restricting measures. However, these 
measures proved insufficiënt to prevent the fonnation of smog. 
Therefore a total or partial traffic ban is of ten advocated. The 
following article wül go into the effects of such a measure 
for the economie activity. Furthermore the authors will discuss the 
technical and chemical aspects of the fonnation of smog and the legal 
complicaüons of a driving ban. 
Prof Dr Mr J.G."W. Simons - Drs H.P . Wansink* 
Smog, a contraction of the words smoke and fog, is the name used for short 
periods of increased air pollution. In this context a short period is interpreted as a 
period of one to ten days. The serious air pollution levels occur on a national or 
even a European scale. 
A distinction should be drawn between summer smog episodes and winter smog epi-
sodes . 
Prof Dr Mr J . C W . Simons is a professor of transportaction economy in the Vrije 
Universiteit in Amsterdam, and Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce for Rot-
terdam and the Lower Maas; Drs H.P. VJansink is management assistant at the 
Transport department of the Chamber of Commerce in Rotterdam. Both authors 
presented introductions at the smog conference organized by the Dutch Study 
Centre for International Management, which was held in Maarssen (the Nether-
lands) on December l s t . 1989. 
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SUMMER SMOG 
Summer smog occurs predominantly with light (easterly) winds and good, i . e . warm 
weather. Typical components are ozone, nitrogen dioxide, aldehydes, aerosol, nitric 
acid, other acids and peroxide compounds (1) . Tiie first two components, ozone 
(03) and nitrogen dioxide (N02) play an important par t in the discussion on smog; 
together these components form the so-called oxidant (Ox). 
As the various processes leading to the formation of the oxidant have ra ther long 
reaction times, said formation will only occur if the above type of weather persis ts 
for some time. 
Generally speaking summer smog is a supraregional problem. The Rijksinstituut voor 
Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiëne (the National Institute for Public Health and En-
vironmental Control - RIVM) has calculated to what extent pollution sources in the 
Netherlands, including traffic, contribute to the formation of smog(2). Dutch sour-
ces account for ten percent of the national ozone level, while approximately half of 
the national concentration of nitrogen oxides (NOx), including nitrogen dioxide, can 
be attributed to national emissions, as stated in this RIVM report . The contribu-
tions of Dutch sources were also calculated at urban and street levels, see figure 
1. Figure 2 shows the effects of an elimination of the Dutch traffic at the current 
levels for the major components 03 and N02. 
On a national and urban scale the effect of a traffic ban on the ozone level is mi-
nor, at street level however the ozone concentration will increase significantly in 
case of a traffic ban. This is due to the interesting as well as surprising fact that 
the direct emission of nitrogen oxides (NOx) by traffic reduces the ozone level 
through chemical reactions with ozone (3) . 
During a traffic ban less ozone will be decomposed at street level, due to the de-
creased emission of nitrogen oxides. At this level, when driving is permitted, traf-
fic will provide a 45% reduction in the ozone concentration! The nitrogen dioxide 
level, however, will decrease considerably in case of a traffic ban. At street level 
the N02 concentration in the air will decrease by 80% if traffic is banned through-
out the country; a local traffic ban will reduce th N02 concentration by 50%. 
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TTCNTBR SMOG 
Just like summer smog, winter smog occurs in periods with little (easterly) wind, 
this time, however, at low temperatures; a layer of snow is conductive to the for-
mation of winter smog. Typical components of winter smog are sulphur dioxide 
(S02) and again nitrogen dioxide (N02). In addition other nitrogen oxides and 
(acid) aerosols/fog also play a par t . 
Air pollution by sulphur dioxide originates predominantly from abroad; see figure 3 . 
Elimination of all Dutch S02 sources will reduce the S02 concentration by 10% on a 
national scale. At urban and street level the effect is greater ; around S02 sources, 
e . g . near polluting factory chimneys, a 30% reduction may be achieved (4) , see 
figure 4. The Dutch contribution to the average nitrogen oxide (NOx) level is lar-
ger ; on a national scale approximately 50%, on an urban scale approximately 70% and 
in the streets as much as 85% (5) . 
Particularly on a local scale, the production of nitrogen dioxide, like that of any 
nitrogen oxide, can be attributed largely to Dutch sources, such as the Dutch 
traffic. Nationwide a traffic ban would reduce the nitrogen dioxide concentration by 
less than 5%. On an urban scale this will be 20% and at street level it will be 40% 
(see figure 4) . Elimination of all Dutch N02 sources would yield a 40% (see figure 
4) . Elimination of all Dutch N02 sources would yield a 40% lower nitrogen dioxide 
concentration on an urban scale and a 55% lower concentration at street level. If a 
traffic ban would be imposed only in the cities, these figures would be 15% and 30% 
respectively (6) . 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK (7) 
As stated in the introduction, a possible traffic ban received a lot of attention in 
the discussions within the various groups. The question remains, however, whether 
traffic restr ict ing measures are legally feasible. Under article 48 of the "Air Pol-
lution Act" the Royal Commissioners in the provinces are authorized to issue general 
regulations with respect to establishments, equipment, fuels and polluting activities. 
Road traffic is undisputedly covered by these terms, bu t which criteria apply? 
They are : "specially circumstances of a temporary nature" , "provision urgently 
required" and "in the interest of public health". Obviously, in addition to these 
legal criteria, the general principles of good management also apply. Regulations 
will e .g . have to comply with the principle of the least pain; they wül have to be 
announced as soon as possible and there will have to be possibüities for releases 
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and administrative compensation. The conclusion, therefore, should be that article 
48 of the "Air Pollution Act" offers only limited possibilities. In particular the ques-
tion arises whether it will be feasible to demarcate an area which is composed in 
such a way that an adequate check can be kept on possible offenders, while the 
area does not comprise any places that are not in the least affected by conditions 
which make it neeessary, in the interest of public health, to take such measures. If 
it turns out that the formation of smog is not a special circumstance, but a fre-
quently recurr ing condition, then consideration should be given to seeking other 
legal grounds on which to base any neeessary measures. 
Besides these legal doubts which could be cast on an traffic measure, it is also to 
be expected that there will not be a lot of public support , as long as the need for 
measures on account of health aspects and clearly visible environmental pollution is 
not obvious. In addition, t rade and industry will also have to contend with economie 
losses. 
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ECONOMIC ACTTVITY 
Af ter the concise discussion of the legal framework, attempts will now be made to 
estimate the short-term (monetary) economie consequences that ensue from traffic 
restr ict ing measures. In particular we shall deal with the consequences of banning 
traffic in the province of South Holland; not only is this the most important pro-
vince of the Netherlands in an economie sense, it is also the province with the 
highest smog risk within Dutch proportions. 
Obviously the extent of the loss cannot be calculated exactly; however, the fol-
lowing estimate will provide an impression of the order of magnitude of the economie 
losses that are suffered directly. The following amounts are minimum estimates, as 
we have predominantly used figures relating to 1987; meanwhile, the economy has 
grown again (in 1988 by 3.0% and in 1989 by 3.8%) (8) . An even more important 
restriction is that only the shortterm losses are calculated; there are insufficiënt 
data to quantify the long-term losses. The total economie loss obviously exceeds the 
short-term loss. One of the significant long-term consequences is that (foreign) 
customers' confidence in trade and industry will be affected. As a result the export 
position will deteriorate. The consequences of traffic restrict ing measures for the 
competitive position force us to enter into international consultations. The European 
Commission seems to be the proper authority: if the measures are taken on a Euro-
pean level, then disruption of the competitive relations will play a minor par t . 
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Traffic restrict ing measures will have economie consequences for: 
A. The road t ransport of freight sector; 
B . All other sectors of t rade and industry that depend on the normal functioning of 
traffic for the production of goods and services. 
Re A. The economie consequences for the road t ransport sector. 
The calculation is based on the following data: (9) 
- On December 31st, 1987, the road transfer and hauling t rade comprised 11,621 
registered "hauling units" (these may be articulated lorries or lorries with 
trailers) in South Holland. (Throughout the Netherlands there were approxima-
tely 50,000 registerd hauling uni tes . ) 
- The fixed costs average Dfl. 80 , - to Dfl. 90 , - per hauling unit per hour (lorry 
plus d r ive r ) . 
- Per day a hauling unit is driven for an average of ten hours (the drivers can 
take tu rns if necessary) . 
From this we can deduce that a 24 hour traffic ban will entail a loss of 
11,621 x Dfl. 85 , - x 10 = Dfl. 9,877,850.-
in road transfer and hauling. In addition to professional freight t ransport , private 
road t ransport is also carried out. This private t ransport comprises approximately 
one third of the professional freight transport (10). The total economie loss for the 
road transport sector in the province of South Holland in case of a complete 24 
hour traffic ban, therefore, would be at least 13 million guilders (Dfl. 9.9 million + 
33%). The Ministery of Transport and Public "Works has calculated that a 24 hour 
traffic ban would mean a loss of 7 to 9 million guilders for the road transfer and 
hauling t rade . Multiplied by 1 1/3 this amounts to a loss of 9 to 12 million guilders 
for road t ransport plus private t ransport . The Ministery based its calculations on 
the NEI report "Economie loss as a result of traffic restrict ing measures" (11), 
issued in 1987. This report which was written by order of the Ministry for Hou-
sing, Regional Development and the Environment, contains a calculation of the con-
sequences of a 24 hour traffic ban for the city of Amersfoort. A new calculation, 
drawn up in cooperation with the Centraal Planbureau (Government body for econo-
mie planning - CPB) by order of the Ministry of Transport and Public "Works and 
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the Ministry of Economie Af f a i rs , yields a loss of 14 million guilders for the road 
transport of freight sector. In the event of a nationwide traffic ban in the Nether-
lands the loss is estimated at Dfl. 65 million in this calculation. Both calculations 
point in the same direction: a total driving ban in South Holland will cost ap-
proximately 13 million guilders per day in road t ransport . 
In case of a partial driving ban (driving would be allowed between 20.00 or 24.00 
hours and 06.00 hours) the amount of the loss will obviously be lower. However, it 
is not feasible to handle all the traffic during the night (fresh daily items e .g . are 
deliverd several times per day) , and besides this would also cause problems with 
respect to loading and unloading. Indeed there will be some sort of a "catching up 
demand" on the par t of the customers, but this will not be complete. 
Following the Ministry of Transport and Public VJorks it is assumed that half of the 
total loss will be compensated for by the time during which driving would be al-
lowed, while the remaining loss may be halved once more as a result of the possible 
catching up demand (12). In case of a partial driving ban, therefore, an economie 
loss remains of one quarter of the loss ensuing from a total driving ban. For the 
road transport sector this amounts to 1/4 x Dfl. 13 million = Dfl. 3.25 million. On 
the whole this sum corresponds to the amount of Dfl. 2.3 to 3 million per day which 
was calculated by the Ministry on the basis of the assumptions included in the NEI 
report . 
Re B. The economie consequences for the other sectors 
Besides a direct loss of production in road t ransport , a traffic ban will entail loss 
of production in other sectors. Companies working with marginal stock according to 
the "just-in-time" principle will have to suspend their production as they run out of 
stock. Economie losses may be suffered because employees can no longer get to 
work, products cannot be transported etc. Major losses will occur in the fruit and 
vegetable sectors . For example, the Commodity Board for Fruit , Vegetables and 
Mushrooms reports that every day some Dfl. 16 million worth of fresh products is 
turned over at the auctions in South Holland. This turnover is lost completely in 
case of a traffic ban, even if it has not been announced fully and beforehand: the 
organization of substi tute transport will take more time than the announcement will 
allow; in its interim report the South Holland working group proposes that the 
measures which are issued not later than 13.00 hours on day one should already 
enter into effect the following morning at 06.00 hours . The building trade also 
depends on a steady supply of materials. A stagnation in this supply will imme-
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diately result in high costs. For example, according to the constructors of the 
railroad tunnel in Rotterdam a suspension of the supply of construction materials 
and soil removal would mean a loss of Dfl. 750,000.- per day. Another example may 
be derived from the food and stimulant indust ry: a mük factory would be faced with 
major problems when the milk tanks at the farms are full and transportation is 
impossible. In the factory itself the consequences may be disastrous as well: if the 
processed milk cannot be transported and tu rns sour in the equipment, it would 
take a tremendous operation to make the entire unit suitable for production again. 
The superfluous milk could also create an ecological problem. Furthermore, one 
should bear in mind that closing down continuous working plants on account of 
insufficiënt supply may lead to a substantial loss, considering the start ing up and 
closing down costs. 
As stated above, long-term losses are not taken into consideration in the calcu-
lations, but they obviously do exist . For instance, the long-term export position of 
the port of Rotterdam is at issue. If the measures that are taken result in a sus -
pension of the storage and transfer activities in the harbour , the long-term eco-
nomie consequences could be extensive. In this context it should be stated that 
under article 48 of the Air Pollution Act the Royal Commissioner is authorized to 
prohibit the use of the harbour facüities. Such a prohibition implies that almost the 
entire harbour will go "down". As a result the reliability of the harbour will be 
affected and its users will be faced with higher costs, due to the longer delays. 
Because of this the competitive position as compared to harbours abroad will de-
cline, taking into account that the regulations with respect to the environment vary 
from one country ot another. A possibly less str ingent environmental legislation in 
foreign harbours may place these harbours in a more favourable competitive posi-
tion. Particularly in the field of t ransport , with its delicate balances, these types 
of disruptions may have major consequences. 
On the basis of the NEI study concerning Amersfoort the Ministry of Transport and 
Public VJorks, in cooperation with the Ministry for Housing, Regional Development 
and hte Environment, has calculated the loss of production and the loss of added 
value in case of a total traffic ban (24 hours a day) throughout the provinee of 
South Holland and in case of a traffic ban which will be limited to cities in South 
Holland with populations of over 40,000. A letter from - then - Minister Nijpels to 
the Dutch Lower Chamber dated October 17, 1989 (13) states several of these fi-
gures , see table 1. 
VJith an increasing number of days the amounts of the losses increase more than 
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proportionally in the calculation based on the NEI s tudy; the argumentation is that 
in some cases there is still room to improvise, in case of a one or two day traffic 
ban; th is , however, will come to an end soon. This calculation is based on the 
assumption that all employees are able to reach their place of work. The latest 
calculation (on the basis of CPB data) arrivés at higher amounts for the losses, at 
any rate for the first few days of the traffic ban. In the "CPB calculation" it was 
assumed that in case of a traffic ban employees would not be able to work for an 
average of 20% of the working hours on account of their benig unable to reach their 
place of work (in time), which would also cause a 20% loss of production. In our 
opinion the latter seems to be a ra ther pessimistic view, as in some cases the loss 
of production may tu rn out smaller than the number of working hours lost, if the 
work is redistr ibuted. The sizeable margins (loss in South Holland Dfl. 100 - 250 
million per day) in the results of the "CPB calculation" could have been avoided if 
the calculations had been carried out with more accuracy; this would require a lot 
of computer time and involve high costs, while even then the outcome would remain 
an indication. 
In the calculations a distinction is made - in addition to the one with respect to the 
road transport sector - as to loss of production value and loss of added value (14). 
Loss of added value on account of the smog measures forms a par t of the loss of 
production value. Ambiguous figuring in the report on Amersfoort nas caused some 
confusion in this respect (15). 
The added value which is not realized (not being able to br ing the production fac-
tors into action) leads to the loss of added value. In some cases it is doubtful 
whether the loss of production corresponding with this loss of added value will be 
incurred to the f uil extent . If the goods and services used in the production pro-
cess keep well, such as sand or br icks , then they can still be used in a next pro-
duction cycle. In this case one could maintain that the loss resulting from the smog 
measures would not be greater than the loss of added value, provided that the lost 
days can be made u p . If such is not the case, the annual production will actually 
decrease with the production of the number of days on which no work could be 
done on account of the smog measures. If the goods and services used in the pro-
duction process are perishalbe, such as milk, these will also be lost as a result of 
the smog measures. In that case th loss will certainly exceed the loss of added 
value and be equal to the production value. 
Table 1 lists the results of the various calculations with respect to a total traffic 
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ban . 
A partial traffic ban (driving would be allowed at night between 24.00 hours and 
06.00 hours) means a reduction of the economie loss, also to the "other sectors" . In 
this case for a limited number of days (a traffic ban for more than five days on 
account of smog does not seem realistic) the short-term loss will increase no more 
than proportionally to the number of days. During the hours that traffic is allowed 
there will often be sufficiënt opportunities to continue production on an improvised 
basis for five days . This yields the picture outlined in table 2, with respect to a 
partial traffic ban in the province of South Holland. This estimate, based on the 
NEI repor t , does not take into account any additionai labour costs and organization 
costs, which could yet increase the amount of the loss. The city of Rotterdam 
roughly calculates the loss at an amount similar to the figures presented in table 2. 
A partial traffic ban for a period of two days in the Rijnmond area will lead to a 
loss of Dfl. 55 million (16). 
- 10 -
Table 1 
Short-term economie loss in case of a total traffic ban (all amounts in millions of 
guilders). 
Duration of 1 2 3 4 5 
traffic ban \ 
(in days) 
Throughout production. 58 116 203 290 405 
province of of which: 
South Holland added 
value 31 82 132 183 243 
road transport 13 26 39 52 65 
Idem, according production 100-250 200-500 300-750 400-1000 500-1250 
to new "CPB- of which: 
calculation" added value 75-135 150-270 225-405 300-540 375-675 
road transport 14 28 42 56 70 
In cities with production 27 54 98 143 204 
popuiations over added value 17 34 56 79 101 
40.000 in South 
Holland 
Throughout the production 370-1000 740-2000 1110-3000 1480-4000 1850-5000 
Netherlands of which: 
added value 240-550 480-1100 720-1650 960-2200 1200-2750 
road transport 65 130 195 260 325 
a) 
production is understood to mean the market value of the goods and services 
produced. 
added value is the difference between the market value and the consumption of 
goods and services used in the production process. 
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Table 2 
Short-term economie loss in case of a partial traff ic ban (a l l amounts in millions 
of guilders). 
Number of days 1 2 3 4 5 
Traffic ban production 23 46 69 92 115 
throughout of which: 
province of added value 15 30 45 60 75 
South Holland road transport 3 6 9 12 15 
THE EFFECT OF THE MEASURES 
The calculations prove that banning traffic will have far-reaching economie conse-
quences. The public can only be expected to accept such radical measures if they 
clearly have a positive effect, in particular by di mi nishing the prevailing hazards to 
the public health. 
In its report entitled "The health risk of city dwellers as a result of exposure to 
air pollution during summer episodes and the effect of traffic restrict ing measures" 
(17) the RIVM (National Institute for Public Health and Environmental Control) 
investigates which summer smog components constitute health hazards. It is con-
cluded that ozone (03) should be regarded as the main component for the develop-
ment of health effects. Under equal circumstances, depending on the nature of the 
effect under consideration, ozone is 5 to 15 times more toxic than nitrogen dioxide 
(18), the other major summer smog component as mentioned above. 
Other simultaneously occurring air pollutants as well as factors such as increased 
temperature and relative humidity, can cause additional effects. 
Vfith respect to the effect of a traffic ban during summer smog episodes the RIVM 
concludes: 
"If motorized traffic in cities with populations of over 300,000 is banned altogether, 
and if wind speeds do not exceed 1 m/s, the maximum 1 and 8 hour average 03 
concentrations in the leeward par t of the city will decrease by approximately 10%. 
The 1 hour average concentration of a number of other lung irritative components 
will decrease by 10-65%. The positive effect of traffic restricting measures on the 
./12 
- 12 -
quality of the air in the city will be less for cities with populations of less than 
300,000 and/or in case of wind speeds in excess of 1 m/s . Expectations are that if 
the pat tern of activities of the population in the larger cities remains the same, a 
ban of all motorized traffic would reduce the health risk in the leeward par t of the 
city by 15-20% at the most: approximately 10% due to the decrease of 03 effects and 
5-10% due to the decrease of effects caused by other components. Although the 
concentration of a number of these components - including N02 - shows a consider-
able decrease, it is not very likely that this will have a significant effect on the 
reduction of this r isk , since their toxicity as compared to that of 03 is ra ther 
minor" (19). 
It is remarkable that even in extremely unfavourable conditions, viz. little wind and 
in the leeward par t of a large city, the decrease in health risk is 15-20% at most, 
provided still that there are no changes in the pat tern of activities. The latter 
condition, however, does not seem very probable. It is more likely that on car-free 
days the behaviour of the urban population will change; chances are that this will 
lead to a longer and more active stay outdoors. This change in the pattern of acti-
vities can, despite the decreased 03 concentration, result in an increase of the 
inhaled dose, which would cause a contrary effect on the health risk! 
The effects of winter smog on public health and in this respect the effect of traffic 
bans during winter smog episodes have not been investigated sufficiently to warrant 
statements similar to the ones given above in relation to summer smog. The RIVM is 
preparing a specific s tudy aimed at winter smog (20). 
Vfe can conclude that traffic restricting measures, in case of summer smog anyway, 
will have little effect in the Netherlands; with respect to winter smog further r e -
search will be required to produce unambiguous statements. 
STRUCTURAL MEASURES 
Controlling smog b y means of a traffic ban during smog episodes is a very costly 
way to treat symptoms, and one with a disputable effect as well. In our opinion 
structural measures aimed at preventing smog episodes are preferable. Here we can 
distin guish: 
- technical measures; a good example is the introduction of the catalytic converter 
for cars . With a controlled threeway catalytic converter petrol-engined cars can 
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become 80-90% cleaner. Application of this technique can reduce passenger car 
NOx emissions b y 80% in the year 2010, as compared to a situation featuring 
"dirty" cars only (21). 
At the moment industries are working hard on the development of a clean diesel 
engine; since May 1989 the municipal t ransport company in Utrecht for example 
has been operating a number of diesel buses with engines whose emission of 
nitrogen oxides is considerably lower than that of ordinary diesel engines (22). 
- international consultations; many pollutants contributing to the formation of smog 
originate from countries situated east of the Netherlands. It appears that the 
political revolutions in the Middle and Eastern European countries have created 
an atmosphere offering more opportunties for reduction of the air pollution ori-
ginating from those regions. 
- changing the pat tern of mobility; this includes the reduction of the use of cars 
in commuter traffic and promotion of the use of collective t ransport , but also the 
reduction of the distances between place of residence and place of work. 
As stated in the National Environmental Policy Plan - under action items A195a and 
A196 - (23), one of the possibüities to reduce the use of cars in commuter traffic is 
the collective transportation of commuting employees. VJe can distinguish public 
t ransport and company t ransport ; the latter comprises the private transportation of 
groups of employees arranged by the companies themselves. In its Regional Econo-
mie Action Plan the Chamber of Commerce in Rotterdam aims to promote collective 
transport in the region, wherever possible (24). 
In the consultations with representatives from the government, employers and em-
ployees it was decided to establish a working group which is to investigate the 
possibüities for collective transport around Rotterdam. Meanwhile these consulta-
t ions, which are stül going on, have shown that it seems a good idea to have an 
investigation carried out among approximately 800 companies with over 50 employees 
in the Rotterdam area, into the possibüities for coüective t ranspor t . Eventually this 
wül result in the drafting of küometre reduction plans for companies. 
A recent NEA study shows that company t ransport can contribute significantly to 
the reduction of commuter traffic by car (25). This s tudy points out that in former 
years company transport was much more extensive than nowadays. In 1960 for in-
stance company transport accounted for approximately 10% of the total commuter 
t ransport ; by 1987 this figure had dropped to 2%. The 1970's and (especiaüy) the 
1980's showed an absolute decrease in company t ransport . This can be attr ibuted to 
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several causes: 
• the exponential growth of car ownership, in eonnection with the general p re -
ference among workers to use their own cars ; 
• the number of employees in the companies and sectors in which company t rans -
port is (could be) used most extensively has decreased considerably, in a r e -
lative as well as an absolute sense. 
• smaller companies, various sectors of the service industries and the government 
have all introduced variable working hours . The consequent staggering of com-
muter t ransport has reduced the possibüities for company t ranspor t . 
• employers have sought possibüities for cost reduction by making agreements with 
public t ransport companies in order to plan regular services in such a way that 
they may be used by employees. This way commuter traffic will be subsidized by 
the government. 
TABLE 3 - National passenger traffic 
Passenger küometers 
(x Dfl. 1,000,000,000) 
1960 1970 1980 1987 
Total passenger traffic 
of which: by passenger car 
of which: by public t ransport 
of which: by group transport 
of which: by other means of t ransport 
( tours , taxi, walking, moped e tc . ) 
Total commuter transport ± 
of which: by passenger car 
of which: by public t ransport 
of which: by company transport ± 
of which: by other means of t ransport 
Total group transport 
of which: by bus (seating capacity 
9 - ± 55) 
of which: by car/minibus (0-8) 
57,9 120,4 148,8 168,8 
15,9 79,7 108,1 127,9 
13,9 13,4 14,8 15,5 
2,2 2,6 2,6 1,7 
25,9 24,7 23,3 23,8 
12,7 ± 26,5 32,7 38,8 
23,2 28,7 
4 , 3 5,0 
1,3 1,5 1,2 0,8 
4 ,0 4 ,0 
2,2 2,6 2,6 1,7 
1,9 2,2 2 ,1 1,1 
0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 
SOURCE: CBS/NEA 
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The downard tendency of the company transport share in the total passenger t r a n s -
port can be changed into an upward one, provided government as well as trade and 
industry put in the required efforts. The NEA has calculated that a government 
contribution of 30% towards the costs of company transport in 1987 these amounted 
to Dfl. 111 million, so the contribution would come to some 35 million guüders -
would be required to maintain company transport as it is (26). From the NEA cal-
culations one can deduce that a 30% government contribution might be sufficiënt to 
realize of maintain, as the case may be , 3,500,000,00 (low estimate) to 5,600,000,000 
(high estimate) passenger kilometres in company t ransport in the Netherlands. 
Supporting government measures, however, will be needed, in particular traffic 
facilities for company t ransport . At an average passenger car occupation of 1.1 
passenger the above-mentioned increase of company transport would save 
3,200,000,000 to 5,000,000,000 car kilometres in commuter traffic (27). The eco-
logical advantages are obvious and of a structural na ture . 
CONCLUSIONS 
The above has shown that in case of smog formation in the Netherlands traffic 
restrict ing measures will have little effect, particularly in case of summer smog, 
even if all traffic would be banned entirely. The question remains whether it would 
be feasible to demarcate an area which is composed in such a way that an adequate 
check can be kept on possible offenders, while the area does not comprise any 
places that are not affected by conditions necessitating, in the interest of public 
health, just these measures. It is certain, however, that the economie consequences 
of a traffic ban will be considerable. A 24 hour traffic ban in the province of South 
Holland will lead to a short-term loss of at least 58 million guilders. In view of 
these high costs and the minor effect on public health there will be little public 
support for such a measure. 
With respect to the combat of smog a structural approach is preferable to a " t reat-
ment of symptoms" such as a traffic ban. Examples of possible s tructural solutions 
include technical measures such as catalytic converters in combustion engines, r e -
ducing air pollution at the source, including those abroad, and changing the pat -
t em of mobility such as promoting collective transport in order to reduce the use of 
cars in commuter traffic. 
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NOTES 
(1) This information is based on a lecture by Dr R.M. van Aalst of the Rijksin-
sti tuut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiëne (National Institute for Public 
Healthe and Environmental Control), which was presented at the smog confer-
ence organized b y the SCIM on December l s t , 1989. Please refer to this lec-
ture for more detailed technical information. 
(2) D. Onderdelinden, RIVM-report no. 228702005, "Perioden met verhoogde lucht-
verontreiniging, schatting van de (verkeers)bijdrage aan concentratieniveaus11 
("Periods with increased air pollution, an estimate of the (traffic) contribution 
to concentration levels"), Bilthoven, April 1988. 
(3) For the complex chemical relation between nitorgen oxide and ozone concen-
trations in the air please refer to the RIVM report mentioned under note (2) , 
e .g . on page 3. 
(4) Idem, page 13. 
(5) Idem, page 6. 
(B) Idem, page 13. 
(7) For a more detailed discussion of the legal possibilities with respect to a traffic 
ban please refer to the lecture by Prof Mr N . S . J . Koeman, which was presen-
ted at the smog conference of December l s t , 1989. 
(8) The growth figures pertain to the domestic product , source CBS (Central 
Statistical Office). 
(9) These data were obtained from the road transport organization NOB (National 
Organization for the Road Transfer and Hauling Trade) . 
(10) This ratio is based on data obtained from the CBS and the Ministry of Trans -
port and Public Works. Internationally plus nationally 8.2 + 148 = 156 million 
tons were carried in private transport during 1988; the road transfer and 
hauling t rade took care 251 + 42.2 = 293 million tons. To be on the safe side, 
a multiplier of 1/3 was used, on account of the higher average distance per 
run in the road transfer and hauling t rade . 
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(11) Drs . R. Voskuil and Drs . Ing. P.M. Blok of the foundation the Nederlands 
Economisch Insti tuut (the Netherlands Institute for Ecoiümics), "Economische 
schade ten gevolge van verkeersbeperkende maatregelen" ("Economie loss r e -
sulting from traffic restr ict ing measures"), Rotterdam, December 1987. 
(12) Up until now, as f ar as we know, this topic has not been studied furhter . 
(13) See Proceedings of the Dutch Lower Chamber, meeting year 1989-1990, 21 234, 
no, 2. 
(14) As regards road t ransport production is equated with the added value; since 
this sector provides services this is a simplification which comes close to rea-
lity. 
(15) See note (11), e . g . page - i i - . 
(16) See memorandum "Economische schade door maatregelen bij smog-alarm" ("Eco-
nomie loss resulting from measures taken in case of smog a ler t") , city of Rot-
terdam, July 1989. 
(17) P . J .A . Rombout, H.C. Eerens and F.A.A.M, de Leeuw, RIVM-report no.67890-
2001, "Gezondheidsrisico van stadsbewoners door blootstelling aan lucht-
verontreiniging tijdens zomerepisoden en het effect van verkeersbeperkende 
maatregelen" ("Health risk of city dwellers as a resul t of exposure to air pol-
iution during summer episodes and the effect of traffic restricting measures"), 
Bilthoven, July 1989. 
(18) Idem, page -15- . 
(19) Idem, page - 3 - en - 4 - . 
(20) At the smog conference Dr. R.M. van Aalst stated that the effects of winter 
smog are probably more serious than those of summer smog; see also note (1) . 
(21) See Tweede Structuurschema Verkeer en Vervoer (Second Structural Scheme 
Traffic and Transpor t ) , Dutch Lower Chamber, meeting year 1988-1989, 20922, 
no. ' s 1-2, The Hague, November 1988, pages 66 and 68. 
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(22) Openbaar Vervoer (Public Transport) magazine, June 1989, pages 14, 15. 
(23) Tweede Structuurschema Verkeer en Vervoer (Second Structural Scheme Traf-
fic and Transpor t ) , Proceedings of the Dutch Lower Chamber, meeting year 
1988-1989, 20922, no's 1-2, The Hague, November 1988, pages 66 and 68. 
(24) Openbaar Vervoer (Public Transport) magazine, June 1989, pages 14,15. 
(25) Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan (National Environmental Policy Plan) , Proceedings of 
the Dutch Lower Chamber, meeting year 1988-1989, 21137, no's 1-2, The Ha-
gue, May 1989, page 202. 
(26) Idem, page 11. 
(27) Idem, page 18. 
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